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Abstract 
 
This study examines contributing factors to the differential forecasting abilities of 
sell-side analysts and the relation between the sentiments of these analysts and 
their media exposure. In particular, I investigate whether the level of optimism 
expressed in sell-side analysts’ reports of fifteen constituents of primarily the 
S&P 500 Oil and Gas Industry1, enhance the media appearance of these 
analysts. Using a number of variables estimated from the I/B/E/S Detail history 
database, 15,455 analyst reports collected from Thompson Reuters Investext 
and analyst media appearances obtained from Dow Jones Factiva from 1999 to 
2014, I run a multiple linear regression to determine the effect of independent 
variables on dependent variables.  I find that an analyst’s forecast accuracy (as 
measured by the errors inherent in his forecasts) is negatively associated with 
the analyst’s level of media exposure, experience, brokerage size, the number 
of times he revises his forecasts in a year and the number of companies 
followed by the analyst, and positively associated with the analyst’s level of 
optimism expressed in his reports, forecast horizon and the size of the company 
he follows.  
 
Keywords: analyst’s forecast, media exposure, experience, brokerage size, 
firm size 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Analysts’ recognition as expert financial intermediaries through their essential 
role of receiving and processing financial information for various market 
participants including investors and accounting researchers has intensified over 
the years. Schipper (1991) and Brown (2001) reveal in their studies that sell-
side analysts have higher audience since they assess large volumes of both 
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private and public information to help make recommendations on the best 
investment decision to clients. As these analysts are considered to have high 
forecasting knowledge and expertise, their recommendations are of great value 
to their clients (Jegadeesh & Kim, 2009).  
 
Exploring the determinants of forecast accuracy according to Clement (1999) is 
essential firstly because of the growing interest of accounting researchers to 
know whether variations exist in analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy and the 
contributing factors to those differences and secondly because capital market 
expectations are surrogated by analyst forecasts. If there are predictable 
variations in analysts’ forecast accuracy, and if they are recognized by capital 
markets then the accuracy of earnings expectations’ proxies can be improved 
by increasing the weights assigned to analysts who are more accurate.  
 
One of the primary channels through which information (financial and non-
financial) is disseminated to the general public is the media. News media 
contents according to Tetlock (2007) cause shifts in broad stock market 
activities’ indicators. This implies that media outlets play an equally important 
role as they facilitate the dissemination of information such as analyst forecasts 
and recommendations to a broad audience, especially individual and 
institutional investors, managers and regulators (Fang & Peress, 2009). More 
so, “celebrity” sell-side analyst forecasts according to Bushee, et al., (2010) 
facilitate the efficient functioning of capital markets.  
 
The question then is whether the media gives more audience to analysts who 
express a higher level of optimism in their lexical sentiments than to other 
analysts. To address the concern, this dissertation explores the factors that 
potentially influence sell-side analysts’ forecasts accuracy and how accuracy is 
associated with the level of media popularity of the analysts receive. I 
specifically investigate how analysts’ attributes including their experience, 
number of companies they follow, size of the brokerage house they work for 
(suggested by Clement, 1999), size of the firms they follow and forecast 
characteristics including the number of forecast revisions and forecast horizon 
influence forecast accuracy and how analysts’ sentiments is associated with 
their media appearances for constituents of the S&P 500 oil and Gas 
constituents. Why Oil and gas? 
 
Notwithstanding the recent fall in the prices of crude oil and petroleum products, 
which brought about huge losses to many oil companies, the Oil and Gas sector 
is among the world’s largest sectors. Oil exports including crude oil and other 
refined products, which have for many years been the leading world trade 
commodity constituted 13 percent of total commodity trade by value in 2006 
(Smith, 2009). In the last decade, world dependence on energy has grown 
steadily with oil consumption of countries such as China doubling between 1996 
and 2006 (Ramos & Veiga, 2011). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) world 
Fact Book provides that as at 2013, world crude oil production and refined 
petroleum products consumption reached 85.86 million and 90.05 million 
barrels a day respectively. The industry’s profitability over the years has 
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attracted a number of investors with oil-related funds gaining more recognition 
in financial markets.  
 
Prior research including Mikhail, et al., (1997) provide evidence that analysts’ 
general experience to a great extent has a positive effect on their forecasting 
abilities, which is supported by Clement (1999) whose studies present a similar 
conclusion. Additionally, Jacob, et al. (1999) find that the amount of resources 
available to an analyst potentially affects his forecast accuracy. With regards to 
media exposure, it has been found that highly ranked analysts are capable of 
causing a ‘sale’, ‘hold’ or ‘purchase’ of a stock because of their ability to  
significantly influence the investing public (Dechow & Skinner, 2000).  
 
More recent studies identify that factors such as boldness and timeliness of 
forecasts (Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000) and analysts’ incentives to optimism 
(Jackson, 2005) may negatively impact their forecasts. Specifcally, Hong, et al. 
(2000) show that less experienced analysts in comparison to their experienced 
counterparts have a lower probability of issuing timely forecasts and a higher 
probability of being terminated for bold forecasts that deviate from the 
consensus. They also find that inexperienced  analysts revise their forecasts 
more frequently. The relation between analysts’ firm-specific experience and 
forecasting accuracy is debatable as opposing results emerged in explaining 
whether variations in forecast accuracy may be attributable to the number of 
years an analyst has followed a particular firm (Clement, Koonce, & Lopez, 
2007). Other studies (Horton & Serafeim, 2009) find that the social network of 
analysts may have a negative impact on their forecasts. 
 
As most investors are somewhat influenced by the recommendations of 
analysts in investment decision-making, it is imperative that these analysts’ 
forecasts have a high level of reliability. Also, given the key role of the media as 
a vehicle that facilitates the dissemination of analysts’ forecasts and 
recommendations, examining the correlation between analysts’ popularity in the 
press, their tone and forecast accuracy may enable capital market participants 
make better investment decisions and increase their stock returns.  
 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: A background of prior 
literature bordering on factors that impact analysts’ forecast accuracy and how 
they relate to their media exposure is presented in the next section. Section 3 
describes the adopted methodology and how the variables are measured. The 
findings are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes with suggestions for 
future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Factors that affect forecast accuracy 
 
Prior research give somewhat inconclusive results as to whether there are 
variations in the ability of sell-side analysts to accurately forecast particularly 
companies earnings and if so, the factors that may be associated with those 
variations. While Richards (1976), Brown & Rozeff (1980), O'Brien (1987), 
O'Brien (1990) and Butler & Lang (1991) find no evidence of differential 
forecasting abilities in their studies, Stickel (1992), Sinha, et al. (1997) and 
Clement (1999) document variations in analysts’ forecast accuracy.  
 
Based on Brown & Chen’s (1991) research, All-American analysts in 
comparison to Non-All-American analysts are more accurate forecasters. 
Similarly, Stickel (1992) find’s that Institutional All-American analysts issue more 
frequent forecasts, which are more accurate than those of other analysts. Also, 
stock prices’ reaction to the upward forecast revisions of All-American analysts 
is more pronounced as compared to that of Non All-American analysts. More 
so, studies by Dugar & Nathan (1995) reveal that analysts’ forecasts for firms 
that utilize investment banking services of the brokerage houses they work for 
are characterized by higher levels of optimism, although there is no significant 
difference in the returns earned by companies who follow the recommendations 
of investment banker analysts and that of those who follow the 
recommendations of other analysts. This is however challenged by Lin & 
McNichols (1998) who find no variations in the earnings forecasts produced by 
the two categories of analysts (those affiliated with a company’s underwriters 
and unaffiliated analysts). By extending O’Brien’s work and using a larger body 
of analysts, Sinha, et al. (1997) also identify differential forecast accuracy 
among analysts, which indirectly suggests that analysts’ performance may 
improve over time. They however fail to give reasons for the differences. 
 
Using time series analysis, Mikhail et al., (1997) show that an improvement in 
the firm-specific experience of analysts enhance their forecast accuracy. Their 
finding may however, not be generalizable because of the small sample size 
they use. Consistent with this conjecture, Clement (1999) runs a cross-sectional 
regression on a larger sample and a wider range of variables and observes that 
forecast accuracy has a positive correlation with analysts’ experience and 
broker size and a negative correlation with the number of firms and industries 
the analysts follow. Contrarily, Jacob, et al. (1999) find no evidence that the 
accuracy of an analyst’s forecast improves with his experience but do establish 
a relationship between employer size and forecast accuracy. In particular, they 
show that forecast accuracy has a positive relation with the degree of industry 
specialization of the brokerage houses that the analysts work for and a negative 
relation with the brokerage house turnover (Clement, 1999). More recent 
studies by Loh & Stulz (2011) suggest that analysts’ media popularity may be 
associated with some of Clement’s proposed variables. Thus, analysts who 
work for larger brokers and are as a result exposed to a wider range of 
resources are likely to have more media appearances.  
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Additionally, Lehavy et al (2011) perform a statistical regression on a 10-k 
filings’ sample comprising over 33,700 observations from 1995 to 2006 to 
determine how readability is correlated with analysts’ forecast accuracy. They 
measure readability as the number of complex words inherent in financial 
reports using Fog index and find that firms with more complicated financial 
reports are followed by a larger number of financial analysts. Also, the earnings 
forecasts for these firms are less accurate, more dispersed and rather 
characterized by a greater degree of uncertainty. This may be because more 
complicated financial reports tend to generate a wider range of analyst 
interpretations, giving rise to more uncertainty. More so, the Fox index that 
Lehavy et al (2011) use, ignores the quantitative complexity of the financial 
reports and as such may impede the practicality of their research finding. It 
measures only the qualitative complexity of the reports, which limit their 
findings. 
 
Correlation between forecast accuracy, media exposure and sentiments 
 
In recent years, various market participants have gained interest in the 
association between the press and the market. Among this growing body of 
literature are the works of Klibanoff, et al., (1998), Chan (2003), Tetlock (2007), 
Tetlock, et al., (2008), Fang & Peress (2009) and Bushee, et al., (2010).  
 
Based on Klibanoff, et al’s (1998) studies, closed-end funds’ price reaction to 
country-specific news published particularly on the front page of The New York 
Times is more pronounced in comparison to when there is no news. Hence, 
they argue that some investors react more rapidly than they otherwise would in 
response to such news events. Using a quantitative approach, Tetlock (2007) 
investigates media content and documents that high trading volumes are 
predicted by low media pessimism whereas high pessimism predicts downward 
pressure on prices and a subsequent reversion to fundamentals in stock 
markets. Additionally, the level of optimism in firm-specific news according to 
findings of Tetlock, et al. ( 2008) not only predicts low earnings but also causes 
an abrupt underreaction of stock prices to such news stories. These findings 
suggest that the efficiency of stock prices may be influenced by the content of 
qualitative information reported by the media. 
 
Nonetheless, there is much ambiguity among past papers regarding the extent 
of correlation between the frequency of an analyst’s media appearances and 
his forecast accuracy. While researchers such as Chan (2003) demonstrate in 
his studies that the greater number of star analysts’ status is based on their past 
research quality, implying that a positive correlation may exixts between the two 
variables, others including Fang & Peress (2009) argue that an analysts who 
has a relatively higher level of media popularity is more likely to issue less 
accurate forecasts as a result of the conflict of interest he may encounter. 
Chan’s (2003) argument is however supported by Fang & Yasuda (2014) who 
make a comparison between the forecasts of All-American (AA) analysts with a 
high level of media appearance and those of  other analysts for the period from 
1994 to 2003 for some S&P Oil and Gas constituents and conclude that those 
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analysts who have high media popularity are more likely to issue more accurate 
forecasts as well as give more reliable recommendations. Intriguingly, they find 
that AA analysts outperform the market by 6.12% and 2.59% in raw returns per 
year with regards to buy and sell recommendations respectively, reinforcing that 
analysts with a higher level of media exposure may consequently issue more 
accurate earnings’ forecasts. There is a possibility, however, that the implied 
resultant forecast accuracy of high media exposure may be as a result of 
investors’ reacting more strongly to the recommendations of celebrity analysts. 
This viewpoint is buttressed by Bonner, et al. (2007) who reveal that investors’ 
response to the forecast revisions of analysts who are cited more frequently in 
the media is more pronounced due more to the popularity of these analysts and 
not necessarily to the exceptional quality of their performance. 
 
Additionally, Barberis & Thaler’s (2003) study of the investor’s decision making 
process maintain that investor competence and confidence is boosted by the 
familiarity of their sources of information and may as a consequence, make 
investment choices that are favourable to those sources. Their research 
suggests that instead of analysts’ media popularity being dependent on their 
ability to produce accurate forecasts, it is rather how well-known they are and 
their celebrity status that increases their forecast accuracy. This situation 
according to Arkes et al. (1991), is caused by investors’ conviction that popular 
analysts’ recommendations are more accurate. 
 
Much as there is a substantial amount of literature on the determinants of 
forecast accuracy, only a few (Dyck & Zingales, 2002; Clement & Westphal, 
2008) focus also, on the extent to which analysts’ forecast accuracy and/or 
sentiments may explain their media popularity. That is, according to Barber & 
Odean (2008), whether the media prefers anaylsts with more expertise and 
accuracy or the media appearances of those analysts is based rather on other 
subjective factors. The general consensus of the majority of studies in this area 
suggests that analysts’ media popularity is more atttributable to the accuracy of 
their forecasts than to their sentiments. Recent studies by  Rees et al., (2012) 
reveal that among the major factors that determine the media coverage of 
analysts’ is the quality of their forecasts, which may be because of the simple 
fact that reporters are more interested in information from those analysts who 
will enhance the intergrity of their stories.  
 
I contribute to existing literature by determining whether the level of optimism 
expressed in the reports of sell-side analysts plays a significant role in the 
forecast accuracy of the analysts as well as their media popularity.  This is the 
first paper that focuses on the relation between sell-side analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, sentiments and media appearances for the S&P 500 oil and gas 
exploration and production constituents, to the best of my knowledge. If it 
happens to be the situation that there exist in fact very minimal correlation 
between the level of analysts’ media exposure and their forecast accuracy, then 
it may be concluded that observed shifts in stock prices are merely investors’ 
reactions to inaccurate signals. 
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METHOD 
 
Test of hypotheses 
 
Based on the objectives of this study, I test the following hypotheses; 
H1: Analysts who show more optimism in their reports are more accurate 
forecasters. 
H2: Analysts who show more optimism in their reports have higher media 
exposure. 
H3: Analysts who are more accurate forecasters have higher media exposure. 
 
I primarily use Clement’s (1999) approach of regression analysis to examine 
whether analysts’ forecast accuracy is linked to the combination of their 
sentiments, experience, number of companies followed, firrm size and 
brokerage house size. According to Clement (1999), jointly analysing the 
aforementioned variables (with the exception of sentiments) is important 
because they are likely to be correlated.  In order to determine the nature of the 
correlation between the variables, I run a first Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression with forecast accuracy as the dependent variable (Y) and media 
exposure, sentiments, analysts’ experience, number of companies followed, 
firm size, brokerage house size, forecast horizon and number of forecast 
revisions as the independent variables (X’s) then a second OLS regression with 
media exposure as the dependent variable and the same independent variables 
including forecast accuracy used in the first regression. 
 
Dependent Variables 
  
Proportional Mean Absolute Prediction Error 
 
Similar to the method used by Clement (1999), analyst prediction error 
(hereafter APE) is a measure of the absolute difference between a firm’s actual 
earnings and analysts’ forecasted earnings, calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑃𝐸!"# = ∣ 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑆!" − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!"#∣       (1) 
 
Where APEijt represents the absolute prediction error for analyst i’s forecast of 
firm j in year t, FEPSijt is the forecast EPS of analyst i for firm j for year t, and 
AEPSjt is firm j’s actual earnings in year t. Adopting Clement’s (1999) approach, 
I compare the absolute prediction error of each analyst and the mean absolute 
prediction error of all other analysts following the same firm in the same year to 
compute performance.  𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 = 𝐷𝐴𝑃𝐸!"#/𝐴𝑃𝐸!"         (2) 
 
Where 𝐷𝐴𝑃𝐸!"# = 𝐴𝑃𝐸!"#  - 𝐴𝑃𝐸!"  , 𝐴𝑃𝐸!" is previously 𝐴𝑃𝐸!" represents the mean 
absolute prediction error of all analysts following firm j in year t. . Thus, the 
PMAPE of analyst i will be the fraction of his absolute prediction error in relation 
to the mean PMAPE of all analyst following firm j in year t. Consequently, 
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PMAPE takes negative (positive) values representing better (worse) than 
average performance.  
 
To maintain consistency with Clement (1999) and Clement & Tse (2005), only 
EPS estimates with a forecast horizon of at least 30 days are included in 
computing the PMAPE. In addition, Clement (1998 and 1999) observes that the 
probability of recognising systematic differences in analysts’ forecast accuracy 
is higher when one controls for firm-year effects than controlling for firm-fixed 
effects and year-fixed effects. According to Clement (1999), firm-year effects 
are the results of factors such as strikes, mergers and disclosures, which 
increase the diffiulcty or ease for predicting a firm’s earnings in some years than 
in others. Firm-year effects is controlled by subtracting the related firm-year 
average from the absolute prediction error. More so, heteroscedasticity 
(unequal variablity across the DAPEs over a period of time) is reduced when 
the DAPE is deflated by APE as there is greater variation in the DAPEs’ of firms 
with large EPS than that those with small EPS (Clement, 1998). Note that I use 
“prediction” and “forecast” interchangeably to portray the same meaning. 
 
Media Exposure  
 
Inferring from the literature review, one may reasonably conclude that analysts’ 
media popularity influences the accuracy of their forecasts. I expect that 
analysts who are cited more in the media would have more accurate forecasts. I 
measure an analyst’s media exposure as the number of times the analyst 
appears in any of the media sources in Factiva in a particular year discussing a 
particular firm. That is, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝!"# = Number of times analyst i is cited in Factiva discussing company j 
in year t. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Analyst Sentiments 
 
As discussed in the literature review, prior studies (Dyck & Zingales (2002), 
Clement & Westphal (2008)) suggest that there is a correlation between 
analysts’ tone as measured by the number of pessimistic, optimistic or neutral 
words embedded in their reports and the frequency of the analysts’ media 
appearances.  Generally, they find that analysts who are popular in the press 
have a higher level of optimism in their forecasts. Using DICTION 7.0 Textual 
Analysis Software I run a sentimental analysis, which generates the total 
number of words, negative words, neutral words and number of positive words. 
These results are based on a context-specific word-list developed by Loughran 
& McDonald (2011) that contains words (positive, negative or neutral) generally 
agreed to have the corresponding effects on people. According to Rogers, et 
al., (2011), the use of computer textual analysis is theoretically justified on the 
basis that “a set of words has a generally agreed upon effect on readers”. 
I use two measures of sentiments in this dissertation as follows: 
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𝑁_𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  (𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 –  𝑁𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡)/𝑇𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡       (3) 
 
Where N_OPTijt is the net optimism tone of analyst i following firm j in year t, 
PWijt is the number of positive words and NWijt is the number negative words in 
analyst i’s report for firm j in year t.  
 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑈𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 /𝑇𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡         (4) 
 
Where 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 is analyst i’s uncertainty score, following firm j in year t and 𝑈𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is the number of neutral words in analyst i’s report for firm j in year t. 𝑇𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 in 
equations (3) and (4) represent the total number of words in analyst i’s report for 
firm j in year t. 
 
The net optimism and uncertainty tones alone do not reflect an analyst’s 
expression of optimism, pessimism or neutrality about a company he/she 
follows. Consequently, I compute the optimistic (neutral) sentiments as the 
difference between analyst i’s net optimism (uncertainty) score and the mean of 
all analysts who follow the same firm in the same year. That is, 
 𝑂_𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# =  𝑁_𝑂𝑃𝑇!"# − 𝑁_𝑂𝑃𝑇!"        (3’) 
 
Where 𝑂_𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# is analyst i’s net optimism sentiment, following firm j in year t. 𝑁_𝑂𝑃𝑇!"# is as explained in equation (3) and 𝑁_𝑂𝑃𝑇!" represents the mean net 
optimism of analysts following firm j in year t. 
 𝑁_𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# = 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑇!"# − 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑇!"        (4’) 
 
Where 𝑁_𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# represents analyst i’s neutral sentiment, following firm j in year 
t, 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑇!"# is as explained in equation (4) and 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑇!" is the mean uncertainty 
score of all analysts following firm j in year t. 
 
General and Firm-Specific Experience (Analyst Ability) 
 
While it is remains a fact that ability may not be observable, Clement (1999) 
suggests that certain indicators of ability may be observed through the activities 
of the analyst labour market. It is perceived that this market functions in a way 
such that weaker performers are compelled to exit the profession. The absolute 
error inherent in analysts’ forecasts, according to Clement (1999) and Mikhail, 
et al. (1997), decreases with experience, implying that experience postivley 
affects forecast accuracy. A possible explanation is that analysts’ general 
knowledge and skill increases with time. It is likely that as analysts become 
more experienced they may improve in associated job roles such as 
recognising trends in the economy and analysing financial statements. Similar 
to the method used by Clement (1999), an analyst’s firm-specific experience is 
measured as the number of years the analyst issued at least one forecast for a 
particular firm in a particular year, and general experience as the number of 
Sorogho, Samira Amadu/SIJDEB, 1(2), 2017, 133-152 	
	 142 
years the analyst supplied at least one forecast for any of the firms within the 
S&P 500 index in year t. That is, 
 𝐺_𝐸𝑥𝑝!"# = Number of years analyst i supplied a minimum of one EPS forecast 
for any of the firms within the S&P 500 index in year t. 
 𝐹_𝐸𝑥𝑝!"# = Number of years analyst i supplied a minimum of one EPS forecast 
for firm j in year t. 
 
Brokerage House Size (Analyst Resources) 
 
Primarily, when analysts have more resources available to them, they are likely 
to work more effectively. Granovetter (1985) and Burt (1992) indicate that 
certain procedures and policies such as the quality of the sources of industry 
knowledge, training advantages and the amount of resources provided for 
analysts may differ from brokerage house to brokerage house, possibly 
resulting to variations in analysts’ forecasting abilities. Thus, analysts’ forecast 
accuracy may be influenced to some extent by the amount of resources at their 
disposal. Similarly, Stickel (1995) demonstrates that not only do large brokers 
have superior distribution channels, they also have distinctive research support 
networks and strong client relationships.  According to Clement (1999), large 
brokers probably have superior resources that enhance the ability of their 
analysts to supply more accurate forecasts. Brokerage size is measured as the 
number of analysts working for a particular broker in a particular year. That is: 
 𝐵_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" = The number of analysts working for broker x in year t. 
 
Number of Companies followed and Firm size (Portfolio complexity)  
 
The general assumption is that following a large number of companies and 
industries is relatively more challenging. According to Clement (1999), individual 
firms in a larger portfolio are not devoted much attention. Given a circumstance 
where analysts are confronted with identical effort restrictions and diminishing 
returns to effort, the forecast errors of those analysts who follow a larger 
number of firms and industries will be relatively larger. On the contrary, it can be 
argued that analysts who follow more firms tend to forecast more repetitively 
thereby improving their forecasting abilities. The more an analyst forecasts, the 
more expertise he builds and hence the more accurate he will be. 
 
Also, studies show that the size of the firm an analyst follows may have an 
impact on the analyst’s forecast accuracy. For example, Lang & Lundholm 
(1996) identify a positive relation between firm size and forecast accuracy, 
implying that the larger the  firm an analyst provides forecasts for, the higher the 
accuracy of his forecasts. This however contradicts the assumption that larger 
firms have more complex financial reports, which makes is more difficult to 
forecast those firms’ EPS. Duru & Reeb (2002) provide evidence that the 
earnings of more internationally diversified portfolios are more complex to 
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forecast. I however, do not include this proxy beacause the study is based on a 
sample of US companies. 
 𝑁_𝐶𝑜𝑠!" = The number of companies analyst i following firm j in year t, produced 
a minimum of one EPS forecast for. 
 𝐹_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" = The natural logarithm of firm j’s market value in year t. 
 
Forecast Horizon 
 
In practice, the amount of information (in the form of indicators, outcomes and 
other analyst forecasts) available when predicting companies’ earnings varies 
from analyst to analyst. It is therefore reasonable to assume that analysts with 
more information available to them will issue more accurate forecasts especially 
if their forecasts are published after that of other analysts. As such, I include a 
“forecast horizon” variable as a measure of the amount of information available 
to an analyst at the time of issuing his/her forecast. Following Horton & 
Serafeim’s (2009) methodology, I measure forecast horizon as; 
 𝐹_𝐻𝑜𝑧!"# = Actual	EPS	Announcement	Datejt	−	Last	EPS	Forecast	Dateijt  (5) 
 
Where 𝐹_𝐻𝑜𝑧!"#  represents the forecast horizon. A shorter forecast horizon 
implies a more accurate forecast since that analyst is believed to have the most 
information as his/her forecast is issued closer to the actual earnings 
announcement date. 
 
Number of Forecast Revisions 
 
It is generally believed that analysts update their forecasts when they acquire 
new and relevant information. Analysts who update their forecasts more often 
are thus expected to be more accurate. As a consequence, I include a variable 
that measures the number of times an analyst revises his forecast within a year. 
Based on Kim’s (2011) approach, I derive the number of forecast revisions as: 
 𝐹_𝑅𝑒𝑣!"# = = The number of EPS forecasts issued by analyst i for firm j in year t. 
 
Dummy Variables 
 
A dummy variable is an artificial numerical variable used in a regression to 
represent subcategories in a sample. As the sample consist of fourteen 
companies from the S&P 500 Oil and Gas Industry and one company from the 
materials industry, I include one industry dummy with a value of 1 if firm j is a 
constituent of a particular industry in year t and 0 if otherwise to control for 
industry-specific effects. Additionally, I include year dummy variables with a 
value of 1 if an observation is for year t and 0 if otherwise to further control the 
firm-year effects since different economic activities happen in different years. 
One would expect the year of the global financial crises, preceding and/or post 
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global financial crisis (2008 onwards) to have significant effects on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Also the “dot com” bubble of 2000 is expected to have a 
negative effect on forecast accuracy. 
 
Data 
 
I collect analysts’ annual earnings forecasts covering the period from January 
1999 to December 2014 from the Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
Detail History tape. The “Detail file” under I/B/E/S contains company CUSIPS, 
company tickers, analysts’ codes, fiscal period indicator, a measure indicator, 
estimate values (forecast EPS), forecast period end dates, announcement 
dates and times, activation dates and times, actual values (EPS) and 
announcement dates and times from the actual detail file. Analysts are identified 
by their unique codes (analyst codes), which remain unchanged irrespective of 
whether they move from one brokerage house to the other. 
 
Analysts’ reports (in pdf format) are collected from Thomson Reuters 
Investext®. Although the database provides data from as early as 1983, I 
download reports ranging from 1st January to 1999 to 31st December, 2014 to 
maintain consistency with the I/B/E/S earnings estimates. In total, 15,455 
reports are downloaded for analysts in the sample who have EPS estimates in 
the I/B/E/S dataset. A number of analysts with earnings estimates in the I/B/E/S 
dataset have no reports in Investext and excluded from the sample (see Table 
2). A major advantage of Investext is that it provides the full names of the 
analysts, which is very useful in retrieving their media appearances from 
Factiva. The I/B/E/S database provides only analysts’ first names and the 
initials of their surnames and middle names.  
 
From the Dow Jones Factiva database I collect all analysts’ media 
appearances, following the fifteen S&P Oil and Gas companies that constitute 
the sample. Factiva provides access to a wide range of news and information 
sources including newspapers (The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal), magazines (Dailey Variety and The Economist), trade press, 
newswires (AFP, Reuters, Dow Jones Newswire), selected social networks 
(YouTube, LinkedIn, FlickR), A-list Blogs (Oil and Gas Lawyer Blog, 
MoneyBeat) and multimedia sources (BBC, ABC News, CNN, Fox Business, 
WSJ Live, Duetsche Welle) to mention but few. I search, with no imposed 
constraints, each analyst’s number of appearances by specifying his/her full 
name (obtained from the individual reports collected from Investext) including all 
possible names associated with the full name in order to capture all the 
analyst’s appearances. The names are separated with an “OR” in the search 
pane. For example, in a search for an analyst with full name Judson Edward 
Bailey, I include possible names Jud Bailey OR Jud E Bailey. Likewise, a 
search for Robert Muztafago will include Rob Muztafago. This is because 
reporters sometimes shorten the names of some of the analysts, which if not 
included may reduce the analyst’s appearances. It is important to note that the 
first name of the analyst must come before any middle name and surname. To 
maintain consistency with all other databases used in this dissertation, the 
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search is conducted for the period from 1st January 1999 to 31st December 
2014.   
 
FINDINGS 
 
Forecast Accuracy 
 
The findings show that analysts who exhibit smaller errors in their forecasts are 
cited in the media more frequently, which is supportive of the hypothesis that 
analysts with higher forecast accuracy are more popular in the press (H3: 
Analysts who are more accurate forecasters have higher media exposure).  
 
Similarly, based on the results of net optimistic sentiment, analysts who express 
high levels of optimism in their reports exhibit smaller errors in their forecasts, 
which supports the hypothesis that optimistic analysts are more accurate 
forecasters (H1: Analysts who express more optimism in their reports are more 
accurate forecasters). This however, contradicts Hong & Kubik (2003) who 
argue that analysts sacrifice forecasting accuracy by expressing more optimism 
in their reports in exchange for better job opportunities. Furthermore, analysts 
who issue their forecasts closer to the actual earnings announcement date have 
a higher level of accuracy as they are believed to have more information. Also, 
analysts who revise their forecasts more frequently have a higher level of 
forecast accuracy than other analysts.  
 
One thought-provoking finding is that the 2008 year dummy variable coefficient, 
which is the year of the global financial crisis is negative although that of the 
preceding year (2007) is positive. This implies that analysts forecast accuracy 
increased during the crises. A possible explanation for this odd finding may be 
that the effect of the crises started in the subsequent years as the coefficients 
for the 2009-2013 year dummy variables are positive. This shows that the effect 
of the crisis was more pronounced in the post-crisis years than in the actual 
year (2008). The result is however contradictory to Sidhu & Tan (2011) who find 
larger forecast errors of equity analysts and higher dispersion of errors during 
the year of the crisis. 
 
Generally, I find that more accurate analysts appear more frequently in the 
media and express a lower level of optimism in their reports; probably because 
optimistic analysts are less accurate forecasters. Based on the hypotheses 
tested in this study, I expected optimistic analysts to have higher forecast 
accuracy and media popularity but the results suggest the opposite. Consistent 
however with prior research ( Mikhail et al., 1997 and Clement, 1999), I find that 
forecast accuracy increases with experience, though not significant. Contrarily, 
Jacob, et al., (1999) find no evidence of such a relationship, though they 
establish a relation between forecast accuracy and size of the brokerage house 
an analyst works for. Excluding the “forecast horizon” and “number of forecast 
revisions” variables from the regression of forecast errors and the independent 
variables, forecast accuracy is found to increase with the amount of resources 
available to an analyst. More so, forecast errors is negatively correlated with 
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brokerage house size, implying that analysts who work for larger brokers issue 
more accurate forecasts; also in line with Clement (1999).  
 
While Clement (1999) finds forecast accuracy to decrease with the number of 
companies followed by an analyst, the results of this study show otherwise. 
Forecast accuracy is found to rather increase with the number of companies an 
analyst follows. This may be because analysts gain more expertise and become 
better forecasters as they forecast repetitively for a large number of firms. As 
the saying goes “the more frequently you do a particular thing, the better you 
become at doing it”. Consistent with Lang & Lundholm (1996), forecast 
accuracy is found to decreases with firm size; implying that analysts who follow 
larger firms issue less accurate forecast. This may explain the positive relation 
between forecast accuracy and the number of companies followed by an 
analyst. It may be the case that an analyst who follows a larger number of firms 
is able to do so because those firms are comparatively smaller. Furthermore, I 
find that forecast accuracy decreases with an analyst’s forecast horizon, a very 
significant factor and decreases with the number of times in a year the analyst 
revises his forecast, though not significant.  
 
 
Media Exposure 
 
In terms of media exposure, an analyst who is more popular in the press has 
smaller errors inherent in his forecasts, which supports the hypothesis that more 
accurate analysts have a higher number of media appearances (H3: Analysts 
who are more accurate forecasters have higher media exposure). The negative 
coefficient of WOsent (not positive as expected) suggests that analysts who 
have higher media exposure express less optimism in their forecasts. 
Surprisingly, it appears that analysts who express higher levels of uncertainty in 
their reports are those cited more frequently in the media. Analysts who are 
popular in the press have shorter forecast horizons, follow a large number of 
smaller sized firms, are more experienced, revise their forecasts more 
frequently and have more resources are their disposal.  
 
I find that analysts who are cited more frequently in the media are actually more 
accurate forecasters, though Fang & Peress (2009) argue that analysts with a 
high level of media popularity may issue less accurate forecasts as a result of 
the conflict of interest they are likely to encounter. Also, more experienced 
analysts are found not only to be more accurate forecasters but are also more 
popular in the press as one would expect, though the results are insignificant.   
 
Contrary to my expectations, the results show that media outlets in fact give 
less audience to optimistic analysts, perhaps because their forecasts may not 
be reliable as they are characterized by larger errors. Rather, I find that analysts 
who express a high level of uncertainty in their reports appear more frequently 
in the media. Significantly, analyst media exposure is found to increase with the 
brokerage house size and number companies followed by an analyst, and 
decrease with the forecast horizon. In other words, analysts who are popular in 
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the press work for larger brokers and thus have more resources, follow a larger 
number of companies and issue their forecast closer to the actual earnings 
announcement date.  
 
The result of industry dummy showing a negative significant, though 
insignificant, implying that the differences in industrial factors affects may have 
an adverse effect on the media exposure of analysts who follow companies 
from different industries. The insignificance of the results may however be 
attributed to the fact that the sample size is relatively small. 
 
It is quiet puzzling that none of the year dummy variables in the media exposure 
regression is significant, as one would expect the pre-financial crises years 
(2005-2007), the year of the financial crises (2008) and/or post crisis years 
(2009 onwards) to be significant. Again, this may be as a result of the small 
sample size not being representative enough to yield significant results. More 
so, the R2 is very low (0.0401), meaning just 4.01% of the variations is 
explained. A higher percentage of the variations may be explained by a larger 
sample, which may also yield more significant results.  
 
Overall, the findings are mostly consistent with prior literature with a few 
astounding discoveries, though mostly insignificant, which may be as a result of 
the small sample size used in the study. The financial crisis had an astonishing 
upward effect on analysts’ forecast accuracy during the actual year of the crisis, 
which is 2008. The expected impact was more pronounced after that year. It 
has been seven years since the crisis and it appears that the world is still 
suffering the repercussions.   
  
The results suggest that analysts’ characteristics including their sentiments may 
be useful in explaining their forecasting performance variations as well as the 
level of media exposure received by the analysts. By modeling these 
characteristics, studies on capital market expectations may be improved to help 
investors and other market participants make better investment decisions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I find that an analyst’s forecast accuracy (as measured by the errors inherent in 
his forecasts) is negatively associated with the analyst’s level of media 
exposure, experience, brokerage size, the number of times he revises his 
forecasts in a year and the number of companies followed by the analyst, and 
positively associated with the analyst’s level of optimism expressed in his 
reports, forecast horizon and the size of the company he follows.  
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